There's been a steady drumbeat of warmings about a surge in risky corporate borrowing-but not much clarity serious the threat is. At issue is the more than S1 million market in leveraged loans. That'

The economy of the United states after 1952 was the econnomy of a well-fed,almost fully employed people. Despit occasional alarms, the country escaped any postwar depression and lived in a state of boom. A n economic survey of the year 1955, a typical year of the 1950’s, may be typical as illustrating the rapid economic growth of the decade. The national output was value at 10 percent above that of 1954 (1955 output was estimated at 392 billion dollars). The production of manufacturers was about 40 percent more than it had averaged in the years immediately following World War 2. The country’s business spent about 30billion dollars for new factories and machinery. National income available for spending was almost a third greater than it had been it had been in 1950. Consumers spent about 256 billion dollars; that is about 700 million dollars a day ,or about twenty-five million dollars every hour , all round the clock. Sixty-five million people held jobs and only a little more than two million wanted jobs but could not find them . Only agriculture complained that it was not sharing in the room. To some observers this was an ominous echo of the mid-1920’s . As farmer’s shre of their products declined , marketing costs rose. But there were , among the observers of the national economy, a few who were not as confident as the majority . Those few seemed to fear that the boom could not last and would eventually lead to the oppsite-depression.he boom could not last and would eventually lead to the oppsite-depression.
The passage states that incom available for spending in the U.S. was greater in 1955 than in 1950 . How much was it ?

a. 60％ b. 50％ c. 33％ d. 90％

There's been a steady drumbeat of warmings about a surge in risky corporate borrowing-but not much clarity serious the threat is. At issue is the more than S1 million market in leveraged loans. That's Wall Street jargon for loans to business with less than rook-solid finances, Federal Reserve and European Central Hank officials have drawn to the rise in corporate debt and the deterioration or lending standards. The loans are often bundled into securities ollateralized loan obligations (CLOs).
Most of the watchdogs are carceful to say a repeat of the 2007-2008 crisis is unlikely because most of the debt banks. But that creates another problem Regulators focused on banks are largely in the dark when it comes to where the risks he and how they might ripple through the financial system when the economy turns down. A big over-indebted businesses could face severe stress and, in some cases, insolvency, threatening jobs and deepen downturn.
The mechanics of the leveraged loan market will be familiar to students of the housing crisis.
With interesting investors are willing to take greater risks to get higher yields. That makes lots of money available for lending. we makes it easier for less creditworthy companies to borrow .Rather than keep the risky loans on their books, lender them to asset managers that package them into securities -C1Ds-that are sold to investors such as insurers and hedge funds.
Yields on the riskicst portions of CLOs can approach 9% a year. And the growth of leveraged lending has been post crisis bank regulations that helped the rise or shadow lenders financial companics that aren't regulated like market for levcraged loans has more than doubled since 2012.
The risk taking could get worse: With demand by borrowers for levcraged loans declining this year, those still financing have been able to extract looser learns.
About 85% of leveraged loans are held by nonbanks, according to Wells Fargo rescarch.
But banks may play a larger robe than may assumc, according to Gaurav V asisht, drector for financial regulation at the Volcker Alliance, a good-governance group, Banks are involved in all stages of the process. They underwrite loans, sell them to the CLOs, invest in those securities, and then hedge those risks in the market.“One common narrative is that banks don't have much risk or aren't exposed 1o it. Vasisht said at the hearing, "Banks are exposed to it."
Just beeause banks are safer doesn't necessarily mean the financial system is, says Karen Petron, managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics, a regulatory- analysis firm. Debt investors might not be as resilient in a crisis, and their problems could create shock waves. "Banking regulators are being a htte myopic when they 're looking only at the banking system for systemic risk," she says.- Sally Bakewell and Thomas Beardsworth.
What is the main idea of this artiole? ( )

A. lessons learned from the financial crisis
B. the flaws of banking regulation
C. the warnings of regulators
D. the risks of corporate debts

There's been a steady drumbeat of warmings about a surge in risky corporate borrowing-but not much clarity serious the threat is. At issue is the more than S1 million market in leveraged loans. That's Wall Street jargon for loans to business with less than rook-solid finances, Federal Reserve and European Central Hank officials have drawn to the rise in corporate debt and the deterioration or lending standards. The loans are often bundled into securities ollateralized loan obligations (CLOs).
Most of the watchdogs are carceful to say a repeat of the 2007-2008 crisis is unlikely because most of the debt banks. But that creates another problem Regulators focused on banks are largely in the dark when it comes to where the risks he and how they might ripple through the financial system when the economy turns down. A big over-indebted businesses could face severe stress and, in some cases, insolvency, threatening jobs and deepen downturn.
The mechanics of the leveraged loan market will be familiar to students of the housing crisis.
With interesting investors are willing to take greater risks to get higher yields. That makes lots of money available for lending. we makes it easier for less creditworthy companies to borrow .Rather than keep the risky loans on their books, lender them to asset managers that package them into securities -C1Ds-that are sold to investors such as insurers and hedge funds.
Yields on the riskicst portions of CLOs can approach 9% a year. And the growth of leveraged lending has been post crisis bank regulations that helped the rise or shadow lenders financial companics that aren't regulated like market for levcraged loans has more than doubled since 2012.
The risk taking could get worse: With demand by borrowers for levcraged loans declining this year, those still financing have been able to extract looser learns.
About 85% of leveraged loans are held by nonbanks, according to Wells Fargo rescarch.
But banks may play a larger robe than may assumc, according to Gaurav V asisht, drector for financial regulation at the Volcker Alliance, a good-governance group, Banks are involved in all stages of the process. They underwrite loans, sell them to the CLOs, invest in those securities, and then hedge those risks in the market.“One common narrative is that banks don't have much risk or aren't exposed 1o it. Vasisht said at the hearing, "Banks are exposed to it."
Just beeause banks are safer doesn't necessarily mean the financial system is, says Karen Petron, managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics, a regulatory- analysis firm. Debt investors might not be as resilient in a crisis, and their problems could create shock waves. "Banking regulators are being a htte myopic when they 're looking only at the banking system for systemic risk," she says.- Sally Bakewell and Thomas Beardsworth.
According to the article, which of the following statements is true?( d )

A. The mechanics of leveraged loans are different from that of housing crisis.
B. regulators admit that the financial crisis in 2008 might repeat.
C. shadow lenders will be regulated.
D. banks are not immune from the risks of corporate debt.

根据题目要求完成下列任务。用中文作答。
下列两个教学片段选自某初中课堂实录，阅读后回答问题。
片段一
S1：Have you ever been to Paris?
$2: No, I haven't. Have you?
S1: Yes. It' s wonderful.
$2: How long did you stayed?
S1: One week.
$2: The buildings are beautiful, yes?
S1: Yes, and the streets ... the river ...
$2: Ah. Have you ever been in Rome?
S1: Is the Neon bigger than the Chevy?
$2: Yes, it is. Is the Lexus cheap than ...
T: Cheap ...
$2: Is the Lexus cheaper than the Chevy?
$3: No, it isn't. Is the Lexus faster than the Neon?
S: Yes, it is. Is prettier the Neon ...
T: Is the ...
(1)哪一个片段属于准确性训练，哪一个片段属于流利性训练?(6分)
(2)你的判断依据是什么?(12分)
(3)准确性训练和流利性训练对语言学习而言各有何利弊?(12分)

The economy of the United states after 1952 was the econnomy of a well-fed,almost fully employed people. Despit occasional alarms, the country escaped any postwar depression and lived in a state of boom. A n economic survey of the year 1955, a typical year of the 1950’s, may be typical as illustrating the rapid economic growth of the decade. The national output was value at 10 percent above that of 1954 (1955 output was estimated at 392 billion dollars). The production of manufacturers was about 40 percent more than it had averaged in the years immediately following World War 2. The country’s business spent about 30billion dollars for new factories and machinery. National income available for spending was almost a third greater than it had been it had been in 1950. Consumers spent about 256 billion dollars; that is about 700 million dollars a day ,or about twenty-five million dollars every hour , all round the clock. Sixty-five million people held jobs and only a little more than two million wanted jobs but could not find them . Only agriculture complained that it was not sharing in the room. To some observers this was an ominous echo of the mid-1920’s . As farmer’s shre of their products declined , marketing costs rose. But there were , among the observers of the national economy, a few who were not as confident as the majority . Those few seemed to fear that the boom could not last and would eventually lead to the oppsite-depression.
What is the best title of the passage?

a. The Agriculatural Trends of 1950’s b. The Unemployment Rate of 1950’s
c. U.S. Economy in the 50’s d. The Federal Budget of 1952

There's been a steady drumbeat of warmings about a surge in risky corporate borrowing-but not much clarity serious the threat is. At issue is the more than S1 million market in leveraged loans. That's Wall Street jargon for loans to business with less than rook-solid finances, Federal Reserve and European Central Hank officials have drawn to the rise in corporate debt and the deterioration or lending standards. The loans are often bundled into securities ollateralized loan obligations (CLOs).
Most of the watchdogs are carceful to say a repeat of the 2007-2008 crisis is unlikely because most of the debt banks. But that creates another problem Regulators focused on banks are largely in the dark when it comes to where the risks he and how they might ripple through the financial system when the economy turns down. A big over-indebted businesses could face severe stress and, in some cases, insolvency, threatening jobs and deepen downturn.
The mechanics of the leveraged loan market will be familiar to students of the housing crisis.
With interesting investors are willing to take greater risks to get higher yields. That makes lots of money available for lending. we makes it easier for less creditworthy companies to borrow .Rather than keep the risky loans on their books, lender them to asset managers that package them into securities -C1Ds-that are sold to investors such as insurers and hedge funds.
Yields on the riskicst portions of CLOs can approach 9% a year. And the growth of leveraged lending has been post crisis bank regulations that helped the rise or shadow lenders financial companics that aren't regulated like market for levcraged loans has more than doubled since 2012.
The risk taking could get worse: With demand by borrowers for levcraged loans declining this year, those still financing have been able to extract looser learns.
About 85% of leveraged loans are held by nonbanks, according to Wells Fargo rescarch.
But banks may play a larger robe than may assumc, according to Gaurav V asisht, drector for financial regulation at the Volcker Alliance, a good-governance group, Banks are involved in all stages of the process. They underwrite loans, sell them to the CLOs, invest in those securities, and then hedge those risks in the market.“One common narrative is that banks don't have much risk or aren't exposed 1o it. Vasisht said at the hearing, "Banks are exposed to it."
Just beeause banks are safer doesn't necessarily mean the financial system is, says Karen Petron, managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics, a regulatory- analysis firm. Debt investors might not be as resilient in a crisis, and their problems could create shock waves. "Banking regulators are being a htte myopic when they 're looking only at the banking system for systemic risk," she says.- Sally Bakewell and Thomas Beardsworth.
12. Which one is false about the leveraged loans?(。)

A. they are loans provided to companies already holding a considenble amount of debt.
B. It is easier for companies to get leveraged loans.
C. most of the leveraged loans are held by nonbanks.
D. the Federal Reserve is quite sure about the risks of leveraged loans.

There's been a steady drumbeat of warmings about a surge in risky corporate borrowing-but not much clarity serious the threat is. At issue is the more than S1 million market in leveraged loans. That's Wall Street jargon for loans to business with less than rook-solid finances, Federal Reserve and European Central Hank officials have drawn to the rise in corporate debt and the deterioration or lending standards. The loans are often bundled into securities ollateralized loan obligations (CLOs).
Most of the watchdogs are carceful to say a repeat of the 2007-2008 crisis is unlikely because most of the debt banks. But that creates another problem Regulators focused on banks are largely in the dark when it comes to where the risks he and how they might ripple through the financial system when the economy turns down. A big over-indebted businesses could face severe stress and, in some cases, insolvency, threatening jobs and deepen downturn.
The mechanics of the leveraged loan market will be familiar to students of the housing crisis.
With interesting investors are willing to take greater risks to get higher yields. That makes lots of money available for lending. we makes it easier for less creditworthy companies to borrow .Rather than keep the risky loans on their books, lender them to asset managers that package them into securities -C1Ds-that are sold to investors such as insurers and hedge funds.
Yields on the riskicst portions of CLOs can approach 9% a year. And the growth of leveraged lending has been post crisis bank regulations that helped the rise or shadow lenders financial companics that aren't regulated like market for levcraged loans has more than doubled since 2012.
The risk taking could get worse: With demand by borrowers for levcraged loans declining this year, those still financing have been able to extract looser learns.
About 85% of leveraged loans are held by nonbanks, according to Wells Fargo rescarch.
But banks may play a larger robe than may assumc, according to Gaurav V asisht, drector for financial regulation at the Volcker Alliance, a good-governance group, Banks are involved in all stages of the process. They underwrite loans, sell them to the CLOs, invest in those securities, and then hedge those risks in the market.“One common narrative is that banks don't have much risk or aren't exposed 1o it. Vasisht said at the hearing, "Banks are exposed to it."
Just beeause banks are safer doesn't necessarily mean the financial system is, says Karen Petron, managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics, a regulatory- analysis firm. Debt investors might not be as resilient in a crisis, and their problems could create shock waves. "Banking regulators are being a htte myopic when they 're looking only at the banking system for systemic risk," she says.- Sally Bakewell and Thomas Beardsworth.
The ollteralized loan obligations (CLOs)( ).

A. are securities back by loans
B. are sold to companies with good finance
C. have very low yields
D. do not have much risks